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Family Structure, Children, and Law 
Vivian E. Hamilton* 
INTRODUCTION 
The claim that “marriage is good for children” has long helped 
ground arguments for the institution’s extraordinary state support. 
But how sound is this empirically based claim and the normative 
conclusion drawn from it—namely, that marriage merits this 
extraordinary support? This Essay reviews recent studies in the social 
sciences and determines that the “marriage effect” on children is 
difficult to isolate and all too often vastly overstated. Thus the 
normative conclusion, inextricably linked to its supposed empirical 
premise, is deeply flawed. 
Married couples in the United States enjoy significant economic 
and social privileges.1 And the children of marital families reap the 
benefits of their parents’ privileged status. But approximately half of 
all children miss out on these benefits, since they are born into or will 
spend part of their childhoods in non-marital families.2 Public policy 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Yale College. My sincerest thanks to Laura Rosenbury, 
Susan Appleton, and the editors of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for 
inviting me to participate in this symposium. Thanks also to John Frankenhoff for his valuable 
comments on an earlier draft and for his support. 
 1. See infra notes 6–15 and accompanying text. 
 2. Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and Money? The Impact of Family 
Structure on Family Income, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2005, at 57, 58; see also Larry Bumpass & 
Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the 
United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 29 (2000). The shares of children living apart from a 
parent are even higher among African American and Latino children. Id. at 35–36. The 
percentage of non-marital births to single African American mothers is even higher than the 
national average. See id. at 35. In 2002 68.2% of African American children were born into 
non-marital families. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2002, at 49 tbl.13 (2003). 
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thus contributes—indirectly but surely—to the inequitable treatment 
of children based on the marital status of their parents.3 
United States law has eliminated most legal impediments faced by 
children in non-marital families.4 As the Supreme Court stated in 
1972, “[B]urdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for 
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as 
well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”5 Yet, in significant 
respects, our public policy is inconsistent with the spirit of this 
decades-old standard. 
The state-supported privileges and other benefits of marriage are 
difficult to quantify, but they are vast.6 Economic perks annually 
 
 3. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, considering a challenge under the Massachusetts 
Constitution to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, observed: 
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or indirectly, but 
no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal and economic protections 
obtained by civil marriage. Notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s strong public policy 
to abolish legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in providing for 
the support and care of minors, . . . the fact remains that marital children reap a 
measure of family stability and economic security based on their parents’ legally 
privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital 
children. 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003). 
 4. At common law non-marital children held fewer rights than did marital children and 
held no rights of inheritance from either father or mother. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 278 (2d ed. 1988). Beginning in the late 1960s 
the Supreme Court considered–and generally invalidated–legal distinctions between non-
marital and marital children. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding 
that a state cannot require a non-marital child, as a condition of inheriting via intestate 
succession from a non-custodial biological father, to demonstrate that his or her parents married 
after the child’s birth); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that a state cannot 
grant to marital children a statutory right to paternal support and deny that same right to non-
marital children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168–70 (1972) (permitting 
recovery by non-marital child for father’s death under the state worker’s compensation law); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute denying 
recovery to non-marital children for the death of the mother). In Trimble, Justice Powell, 
writing for the majority, rejected the argument that a “State may attempt to influence the actions 
of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate 
relationships.” 430 U.S. at 769. 
 5. 406 U.S. at 175. But the Court has not invalidated all differences in treatment between 
marital and non-marital children. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (holding that 
a state could require a non-marital child, as a condition of inheriting via intestate succession 
from a non-custodial biological father, to provide a judicial declaration of paternity). 
 6. See Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/3
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include billions of dollars in direct federal payments,7 billions of 
dollars in federal tax benefits,8 state benefits that parallel those 
offered by the federal government,9 and billions of dollars in 
workplace-based benefits (including health and life insurance and 
pension benefits).10 
Just as real, albeit even more difficult to measure, are the less 
tangible social benefits that attend civil marriage and benefit marital 
families.11 It is an “esteemed institution,”12 and membership in that 
institution confers “a marker of prestige.”13 Research suggests that 
 
148–52 (2003); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955–56 (noting that a “marriage license 
grants valuable property rights” and listing some of the myriad statutory benefits granted 
legislatively to married couples); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (listing multiple 
state-provided rights and benefits contingent upon marital status). 
 7. See id. at 166–69. Professor Bernstein notes, “The United States government 
subsidizes marriage through transfer payments and other supports that are not means tested. 
These payments constitute a reward that taxpayers as a group bestow on a class of individuals 
based solely on these persons’ being, or having been, married.” Id. at 167–68. She cites as 
examples Social Security transfer payments and Medicare. Id. at 169. 
 8. Id. at 169–72. 
 9. Id. at 169 n.185; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955–56 (noting that “[t]he 
benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every 
aspect of life and death,” and partially listing state benefits conferred upon marital families). 
 10. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 172–75. Private-sector employment benefits, including 
health and life insurance, reflect a convention established by state-sponsored marriage. Id. at 
172. These conventions are sometimes codified in both state and federal laws. See id. Federal 
law, for example, guarantees benefits to workers’ spouses that are underwritten by employers 
and unmarried workers. Id. at 174. Many such benefits are thus an example of what Bernstein 
terms “secondary effects” that result indirectly from state recognition of marriage. Id. at 172. 
She argues: 
To the extent that employers would have chosen not to provide this insurance but feel 
compelled to follow this convention, spouses receive benefits that they would not 
receive but for the fact of their state-sponsored marriage. And to the extent that 
persons covered as spouses rather than employees obtain economic benefit from this 
coverage, fellow policyholders underwrite this benefit, providing an unexamined and 
unjustified transfer on the basis of marriage. 
Id.  
 11. In a 1987 decision the United States Supreme Court noted the “other, less tangible 
benefits” generated by marriage. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987); see also Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 (1878). 
 12. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954–55 (discussing the “nature of civil marriage itself” in a 
decision holding unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution the denial of civil 
marriage to same-sex couples). 
 13. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 848, 855 (2004). See generally Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 
11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 325–35 (2004) (analyzing the “expressive dimension” of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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married couples receive more income and support from family and 
friends than do cohabiting couples.14 The government’s contribution 
to the social benefits of marriage is less direct. But state recognition 
and economic privileging of marriage signals that the marital family 
is the preferred social arrangement. With this in mind, it is notable 
that some states that afford same-sex couples the material benefits of 
marriage, withhold from those couples the right to call their 
relationships “marriage.”15 
Part I of this Essay discusses the effect of family structure—state-
favored and otherwise—on child well-being.16 That children growing 
up with continuously married parents enjoy material well-being and 
developmental outcomes superior to those of children raised in non-
marital families is by now undisputed.17 Yet social scientists have 
tried to isolate and measure the causal effects of marriage itself, as 
opposed to those of other correlated factors, on child well-being and 
have found it difficult to do. Indeed, recent work suggests that 
advantages enjoyed by children living with married rather than 
cohabiting parents are almost entirely accounted for by other factors; 
the most significant are parents’ education, race, and ethnicity.18 
While the empirical studies discussed in Part I provide useful 
information, they leave unanswered important normative questions. 
To the extent that the state conditions receipt of certain benefits on 
marital status (rather than, say, on family need or on children’s status 
as children), it must inquire whether its unequal contributions to 
 
marriage and the message sent by associating oneself with the institution). 
 14. Wendy D. Manning & Susan Brown, Children’s Economic Well-Being in Married 
and Cohabiting Parent Families, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 345, 346 (2006). 
 15. Vermont and Connecticut have enacted “civil union” statutes for same-sex couples. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38bb (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002). These 
statutes give same-sex couples all the state-provided benefits of marriage except the title 
“marriage.” When the Massachusetts State Senate considered enacting legislation that would 
permit same-sex couples to form civil unions (but not civil “marriages”) and receive all the 
tangible benefits of marriage, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion, stated 
that not only was it improper to withhold from same-sex couples the tangible benefits of 
marriage, but to designate their relationships as civil unions as opposed to civil marriages 
“would deny to same-sex ‘spouses’ only a status that is specially recognized in society and has 
significant social and other advantages.” In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 
N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004). 
 16. See infra notes 20–59 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/3
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children and their families are justified. Part II examines this question 
and identifies and evaluates the state’s interest in privileging 
marriage.19 This part first discusses generally the sorts of goals that 
are legitimate for a modern liberal state to pursue by recognizing and 
privileging marriage. It then discusses the state’s primary interest in 
marriage. Borrowing from federal constitutional analysis, it 
concludes that the state’s articulated goals may be legitimate, but 
using marriage as a means of furthering those goals is decidedly less 
so. 
Because of the weaknesses of both empirical and normative 
arguments for helping children through marital privileging, the Essay 
concludes that better policy would be to allocate resources to children 
based on their status as children. Doing so would entail either 
minimizing or eliminating the allocation of resources to adult 
individuals based on their marital status. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL QUESTION: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF MARRIAGE 
AND FAMILY STRUCTURE ON CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING? 
Many studies have found correlations between family structure 
and children’s well-being. Most of these have compared children of 
divorce to children of continuously married parents,20 but there is 
also enough general data to show that children raised in all kinds of 
non-marital families (both children of divorce and those born outside 
marriage) fare less well across a variety of measures than those raised 
in marital families.21 Children in non-marital families, for example, 
 
 19. See infra notes 60–115 and accompanying text; see also Brian H. Bix, State of the 
Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 
n.15 (2000) (noting that the state values marriage, not for its own sake, but rather 
“instrumentally, for the benefits it brings to the individuals, to the individuals’ children, or to 
society generally”). In discussing the “state” generally, this essay refers to all state actors—
federal, state, and local, as well as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government. 
 20. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, 
Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2005, at 75, 77–
78. 
 21. See id. at 75–96 (summarizing studies that compare the well-being and outcomes of 
children of marital families and children of divorced and never-married families); see also 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of 
Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 852 (2005) (surveying social science literature and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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are more likely to be poor than are children in marital families,22 to 
have relatively more behavioral and emotional problems,23 and to 
drop out of high school at a higher rate.24 Academics and 
policymakers across the political spectrum point to those outcomes to 
bolster the argument that the state should continue or increase its 
support of marriage and the marital family.25 
Researchers have found it difficult to isolate marriage from other 
factors that might explain differences in child welfare within 
families.26 For example, many studies have examined how family 
 
noting that “[i]n virtually every comparison done to date, children in nuclear families fare better 
on average than other children”); John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2001) (arguing that social science data support the conclusion that 
“[m]ost children reared in two-parent households perform better in their socialization, 
education, and development than their peers reared in single- or no-parent homes”). See 
generally DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT 
FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 
(1996); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED 
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). 
 22. Thomas & Sawhill, supra note 2, at 63. Thomas and Sawhill note that: 
Child poverty rates vary considerably across races, with children in white families 
much less likely to be poor than their black and Hispanic counterparts. . . . As a whole, 
children in lone-parent families are more than four times as likely to be poor as 
children in married-parent families, while children in cohabiting families are almost 
three times as likely to be poor as children in married-parent families. 
Id.; see also Judith A. Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
1247, 1256, 1259 (2000). 
 23. TAMARA HALLE, CHILD TRENDS, CHARTING PARENTHOOD: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 
OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IN AMERICA 49 (2002). 
 24. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 40–46 (1994). 
 25. See, e.g., William A. Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, 
in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 290, 294–305 (David M. 
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997); Wade Horn & Isabel V. Sawhill, Making Room for 
Daddy: Fathers, Marriage and Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 421, 427–29 
(Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001); Daniel T. Lichter et al., Is Marriage a Panacea? 
Union Formation Among Economically Disadvantaged Unwed Mothers, 50 SOC. PROBS. 60, 61 
(2003).  
 26 See, e.g., Lingxin Hao & Guihua Xie, The Complexity and Endogenity of Family 
Structure in Explaining Children’s Misbehavior, 31 SOC. SCI. RES. 1, 1–2 (2001) (“[G]iven the 
impossibility of experimental designs, it is difficult for researchers to distinguish between the 
‘true’ effects of family structure and the effects of unmeasured confounding factors that are 
correlated with family structure.”); see also Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, 
Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting, Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 876, 879 (2003) (noting that shortcomings of earlier studies include limited samples and a 
narrow range of independent variables). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/3
p 9 Hamilton book pages.doc  9/4/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Family Structure, Children, and Law 15 
 
 
structure influences child well-being (these studies have compared 
children living with cohabiting adults with children living with their 
biological married parents), but this approach “confounds the effects 
of marriage [with those] living with two biological parents.”27 And 
even when studies have demonstrated correlative relationships 
between family structure and child well-being, they have struggled to 
convincingly demonstrate a causal relationship.28 
Researchers conducting more recent studies have worked harder 
to demonstrate a marriage effect distinct from the effect of other 
factors.29 In a number of studies, researchers have refined their 
methods, noting that “contrasting the well-being of [children] in 
married and cohabiting stepfamilies is more appropriate because 
these families share the same basic structure (biological mother and 
her cohabiting partner).”30 They have included in their analyses 
additional variables that may explain some of the observed effects of 
family structure on child well-being.31 In one such study, for 
 
 27. See Manning & Lamb, supra note 26, at 878. 
 28. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 6, at 159; Wendy D. Manning & Susan Brown, 
Children’s Economic Well-Being in Married and Cohabiting Parent Families, 68 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 345, 359 (2006); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People Good or Do 
Good People Marry?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889, 893–94 (2005). 
 29. See, e.g., Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology 
Versus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213 (2003). 
Hofferth and Anderson, for instance, attempted to isolate the effect of marriage on children by 
comparing investments by fathers living with children and their biological mothers in several 
different family forms: married biological parents; unmarried biological parents; biological 
mother married to non-biological stepfather, and biological mother cohabiting with non-
biological father figure. Id. at 215. Comparing unmarried biological fathers with married 
biological fathers, the data found no differences in the number of activities per week fathers 
participated in with their children, or in the number of hours per week the father was around but 
not actively engaging in activities with their children. Id. at 225–26 & 225 tbl.5. But the data 
showed that married biological fathers spent, on average, one hour more per week with their 
children than did unmarried biological fathers. Id. at 226 tbl.6. Moreover, unmarried biological 
fathers rated themselves as being less warm toward their children than did married biological 
fathers. Id. Hofferth and Anderson conclude that “children living with an unmarried biological 
father enjoy less direct engaged time and also experience less warmth than children of a married 
biological father.” Id. at 228. Hofferth and Anderson’s study does not, however, measure 
children’s material well-being or other outcomes. 
 30.  Manning & Lamb, supra note 26, at 880. 
 31.  Id. Manning and Lamb’s study included various measures of academic achievement 
(Peabody Picture Vocabulary Tests, school grades, college expectations); measures of parent 
characteristics (closeness to parents, parental monitoring of children); measures of 
socioeconomic status (family income, mother’s education); measures of family stability 
(number of mother’s marriages, duration of relationships); and sociodemographic and child 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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example, researchers observed that adolescents living with married 
rather than cohabiting stepfamilies enjoyed some advantages 
(although not consistently).32 But they concluded that many of the 
observed differences in behavioral and academic outcomes could be 
explained by the covariates in their models (including parenting 
characteristics, socioeconomic status, family stability, and race and 
ethnicity).33 
Another recent study bears discussion. Professors Wendy 
Manning and Susan Brown sought to update and improve upon 
earlier studies in their 2006 study, which compared the material well-
being of children living in married families to those living in 
cohabiting families.34 Their study drew from the most recent (1999) 
wave of data from the National Survey of America’s Families 
(NSAF), with a sample size of 34,509 children.35 To better isolate the 
significance of union status, they compared children who shared the 
same biological relationship to the adults in the household.36 They 
contrasted children in married families with two biological parents 
versus cohabiting families with two biological parents, and children 
in married step-parent versus cohabiting step-parent families.37 
Manning and Brown also considered socio-demographic status. They 
included parents’ age, education, and work hours,38 and specifically 
 
characteristics (race and ethnicity, mother’s age, child’s age and sex, number of children in 
household, importance of religion). Manning and Lamb note that, by including fewer 
independent variables, prior studies failed to “explore potential explanations about why children 
in cohabiting parent families fare differently than children in other family types, disentangling 
the effects of family structure from other factors.” Id. at 879. 
 32. Id. at 885–90. 
 33. Id. at 886, 890. 
 34. Manning & Brown, supra note 28. 
 35. See id. at 349. Manning and Brown note that studies published as recently as 2002 
rely on data that is now dated, and that some research using more recent data suffers from other 
flaws. Id. at 346. For instance, analyses using the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 
data reflected that the proportion of children living in cohabiting parent families who 
experience poverty was 32%. Id. at 357. The NSAF data reports that the proportion of children 
in cohabiting families who experience poverty has declined to 21%. Id. The decline has been 
most significant for white children living with cohabiting parents (from 24% to 11%), but less 
so for African American children (from 39% to 32%). Id. at 357–58. There has been no 
measurable decline in the proportion of Latino children experiencing poverty, with levels 
remaining unchanged at 32%. Id. at 358. 
 36. Id. at 348. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 350, 355 tbl.3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/3
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examined (as opposed to merely controlling for, as other studies have 
done39) racial and ethnic group variation.40 
Manning and Brown found, as have others,41 that children living 
with married biological parents experienced significantly higher 
levels of material well-being than did children living with cohabiting 
biological parents.42 All children did not benefit equally from 
marriage, however. White children benefit materially more from their 
parents’ marriage than do either African American or Latino 
children.43 Indeed, there was little economic advantage of marriage to 
Latino children at all.44 
In this analysis, Manning and Brown also found that race, 
ethnicity, and education accounted for the correlation between family 
structure and material well-being.45 Among the economic well-being 
measures, parents’ education and work hours explained the gap in 
poverty and high economic risk between white married and 
cohabiting biological parents.46 Slight variation in food and housing 
insecurity according to marital status remained for white families; 
however, no similar marital benefit remained for African American 
and Latino children once parents’ education was included in the 
 
 39. Id. at 346. Manning and Brown distinguish their study from others that failed to 
explicitly consider the importance of race and ethnicity when assessing cohabitation and child 
poverty, including Gregory Acs & Sandi Nelson, Honey, I’m Home. Changes in the Living 
Arrangements in the Late 1990s, ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM POLICY BRIEF B-38, The 
Urban Institute (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310310, and Kurt J. 
Bauman, Shifting Family Definitions: The Effect of Cohabitation and Other Nonfamily 
Household Relationships on Measures of Poverty, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 315 (1999). 
 40. Id. at 348, 355 tbl.3, 351, 356 tbl.4. The researchers constructed separate models for 
African American, Latino, and white families. Id. at 348. Specifically examining race and 
ethnicity uncovers significant differences among white, African American, and Latino families 
in the relationships between family structure and material hardship. Id.. Manning and Brown 
note that models that simply control for race and ethnicity mask important racial and ethnic 
differences in the relationships between family structure and material well-being. Id. at 354, 
357. Manning and Brown cite another study finding that married white mothers experience less 
hardship than do white cohabiting mothers, but that African American and Latina married and 
cohabiting mothers experience similar levels of hardship. Id. at 348. 
 41. See supra notes 21–24. 
 42. Id. at 354. 
 43. Id. at 358. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 354, 358. 
 46. Id. at 357. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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researchers’ model.47 Unobserved processes, such as support given to 
white marital couples by family members, may help explain why 
white marital families experience less food and housing insecurity 
even after parents’ education and work hours are taken into 
consideration.48 
Overall, Manning and Brown’s analysis showed that “the effects 
of family structure are reduced to nonsignificance with just the 
inclusion of parent[s’] education . . . .”49 They concluded that “the 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 346. 
 49. Id. at 354. The researchers note that increased work hours by parents are also 
associated with reduced poverty, but that child and parent characteristics (race and ethnic group 
and education) accounted for at least 70% of the difference in the well-being of children in two 
biological parent cohabiting versus married families. Id. A 2003 study examined the 
relationship between coming from a disadvantaged family background, unwed childbearing, 
completing high school, and experiencing adult poverty. Lichter et al., supra note 25, at 72–73. 
That study found that: 
[O]nly a small portion of the association between having a disadvantaged family 
background and adult poverty operates through unwed childbearing, and most operates 
through educational attainment. From a policy standpoint, the implication is that 
improving educational outcomes for low-income children may be more likely to end 
intergenerational poverty than reducing unwed childbearing. 
Id. at 73. 
 Another study, though not specifically related to marriage, highlights the importance of 
parental education (in this case maternal) to children’s outcomes. Greg Pogarsky et al., 
Developmental Outcomes for Children of Young Mothers, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 332, 338–40 
(2006). The authors examined the relationship between mothers’ age at the onset of 
childbearing (as well as other mediating factors) and numerous developmental outcomes for 
children. Id. at 332–33. Of the mediating factors studied, it found the most significant to be low 
maternal educational attainment. Id. at 339–40. Low maternal education “statistically predicts 
unemployment, gang membership, and early childbearing by the boys . . . account[ing] for an 
average of 20% of the early first-birth effect across these outcomes.” Id. at 340. The researchers 
concluded that “[f]ailure to complete formal education, one of the most central developmental 
tasks of adolescence, can compromise later employment, family formation, socioeconomic 
attainment, and family well-being.” Id. 
 The study did not examine the effect of marriage on children’s outcomes but it did examine 
the effect of changes in caregivers. Id. at 336, 340. Of the outcomes measured, caregiver 
transitions were statistically related only to girls’ early childbearing (8% attributable to 
caregiver transitions). Id. at 339. Ineffective parenting predicted boys’ drug use (27% 
attributable to parenting) and unemployment (6%). Id. at 339–40. Receipt of public assistance 
failed to predict any of the negative outcomes measured. Id. The study analyzed data from the 
Rochester Youth Development Study, an ongoing, intergenerational study of the families of 729 
individuals who were adolescents enrolled in Rochester Public Schools in 1988. Id. at 332. 
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benefits of marriage may be a result of parents’ education and race 
and ethnic group rather than marriage per se.”50 
Their findings suggest the operation of selection processes51 
whereby marital families are, for example, wealthier and better 
educated because wealthier, better-educated people are more likely to 
marry. These selection processes reverse the causal arrow between 
marriage and child well-being. Thus, the preexisting characteristics of 
some individuals make them more likely to marry, and their marital 
families are relatively more successful than are other families. But it 
is arguably the individuals’ characteristics—rather than marriage 
itself—that are primarily responsible for their families’ relative 
success.52 
 
 50. Manning & Brown, supra note 28, at 358. For example, Manning and Brown found 
that for Latino families (who receive little economic benefit from marriage), married and 
cohabiting parents share similarly low levels of educational attainment. Id. White married 
parents, on the other hand, have much higher levels of education than do white cohabiting 
parents. Id. Thus, they reason: 
[T]he gap in the economic well-being of White children living with married and 
cohabiting parents may partially result from the propensity for Whites with higher 
education levels to marry. In contrast, the similarity in the economic well-being of 
Hispanic children living with cohabiting and married parents perhaps reflects the weak 
association between education and marriage among this group. 
Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Hao & Xie, supra note 26, at 6–7 (discussing selection mechanisms). 
Manning and Brown note that: 
[O]ther unobserved processes, such as support from family and kin, decisions about 
the division of labor, and future security of relationships, also may be important 
mechanisms. To the extent that cohabiting partners represent potential spouses, 
policies that encourage movement into marriage may not result in as positive outcomes 
as observed among married parent families. 
Id. at 358. 
 52. See id. at 358; see also Kathryn Edin & Joanna M. Reed, Why Don’t They Just Get 
Married? Barriers to Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2005, at 117, 
123; Thomas & Sawhill, supra note 2, at 57. Edin and Reed note the significantly lower 
marriage rate among poor men and women compared to the marriage rate of those better-off. 
Edin & Reed, supra at 123, 126–27. Poor men and women are about half as likely to marry as 
those with incomes equaling or exceeding three times the federal poverty level. See HALLE, 
supra note 23, at 49. And the marriage rates among the poor continue to decline. The marriage 
rate for poor men declined from 48% to 41% between 1999 and 2000; during the same period, 
the marriage rate for poor women declined from 37% to 33%. Id. 
 Edin and Reed argue that, although poor men and women highly value marriage, they 
believe that they are unable to meet the required financial stability and relationship quality 
necessary to sustain that relationship and avoid divorce. Id. at 123, 126–27. 
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That parents in cohabiting families have disproportionately low 
education levels supports the notion that selection processes 
contribute to differences between marital and non-marital families.53 
More than 25% of cohabiting mothers and 36% of cohabiting fathers 
have not earned a high school degree, whereas only 12% of married 
mothers and 13% of married fathers have less than a high school 
education.54 We might then expect that cohabiting couples will have 
less income than married couples. Studies confirm this to be true: 
even assuming complete financial sharing, 23% of cohabiting 
biological parents experience poverty, compared to 7.6% of married 
biological parents.55 
Both poor and more advantaged individuals aspire to marriage and 
place high symbolic value on it.56 But studies suggest that many 
unmarried individuals believe that it is necessary to be financially 
established prior to entering into marriage.57 Unmarried individuals 
believe that the proper financial position for marriage requires 
something approaching a middle-class standard of living.58 In one 
study, more than 74% of couples who aspired to marriage identified 
their financial situation as a barrier, even though 77% of them were 
already cohabiting.59 Thus they defer marriage until they have 
reached certain economic goals. In other words, cohabiting couples 
are (at least in part) less economically well-off than are marital 
 
 53. Manning & Brown, supra note 28, at 351; Seltzer, supra note 22, at 125 (“Children 
whose parents cohabit are still more likely to be poor than children in married-parent families 
because of the age, education, and employment differentials between those who cohabit and 
those who marry.”). 
 54. Manning & Brown, supra note 28, at 351. 
 55. Id. at 352 tbl.1. 
 56. See Edin & Reed, supra note 52, at 119. See generally KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA 
KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 
(2005); Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 848 (2004); Kathryn Edin et al., A Peek Inside the Black Box: What Marriage Means 
for Poor Unmarried Parents, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007 (2004). 
 57. See, e.g., Kathryn Edin, What Do Low-Income Single Mothers Say About Marriage?, 
47 SOC. PROBS. 112, 117–19 (2000); Christina M. Gibson-Davis et al., High Hopes, but Even 
Higher Expectations: The Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income Couples, 67 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1301, 1307 (2005); Pamela J. Smock et al., “Everything’s There Except 
Money”: How Money Shapes Decisions to Marry Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
680, 686–92 (2005). 
 58. See Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 57, at 1307–08. 
 59. Id. at 1307. 
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couples precisely because they postpone marriage until they are more 
economically well-off. 
Similarly, commentators frequently note that cohabiting 
relationships are less stable than are marital relationships,60 and some 
suggest that marriage itself causes stability in relationships (with, 
presumably, better results for children).61 But research suggests that 
individuals who cohabit aspire to marry but frequently view problems 
in their relationships as a barrier to their marriage.62 It thus appears 
that poor relationship quality causes individuals to avoid marriage, 
and once relationships are strong, the individuals marry. 
There is a large literature that concludes that children of marital 
families enjoy better outcomes63; but once extraneous factors are 
controlled for, the differences that might be said to be attributed to 
marriage itself are far from clear. A “marriage effect” indeed exists, 
but factors other than the supposed “magic bullet” of matrimony 
seem to explain most of the observed differences in the well-being of 
children in marital versus non-marital families. 
II. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION: SHOULD THE STATE CONTRIBUTE TO 
MARITAL PRIVILEGING? 
Federal and state governments privilege and support marital 
families. Children’s receipt of certain benefits, then, depends on their 
parents’ marital status. Unequal treatment of the two classes of child 
citizens—children of marital families versus children of non-marital 
families—should prompt this normative question: Do the state 
interests underlying the privileging of marital families justify 
providing less public support of some children? This Part begins to 
examine that question. 
 
 60. See Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for 
Children’s Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 33 (2000); Seltzer, 
supra note 22, at 1252. 
 61. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 116, 146–49 (2001), Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal 
Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1908–12 (2000). 
 62. Edin & Reed, supra note 52, at 123. 
 63. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
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A. The State’s Interest in Privileging Marriage 
First, it is helpful to discuss the meaning of the “state’s interest in 
marriage.” Professor Brian Bix has noted that the phrase suggests 
governmental interest in the marital status of its citizens as an end in 
itself.64 But he points out that it makes more sense to talk about the 
state’s interest in marriage as “largely instrumental [and reflecting] a 
belief that having citizens married . . . aids other goals.”65 
Understanding the state’s interest in marriage, then, requires an 
examination of the other goals that the state seeks to further through 
marriage. Those goals are not always easy to discern. At the risk of 
stating the obvious, it is difficult to ascribe a single intent or will to 
an institution comprising many individuals. Legislation, moreover, is 
not always transparent, and the government acts through various 
agents (legislators, administrators, public officials, and others), each 
of whom may have distinct views of the state’s goals and their proper 
roles in achieving them.66 
Next, it is useful to consider the role of the modern liberal state. 
Different visions of legitimate state goals exist. One might espouse, 
for example, a truly liberal view of the proper role of government in 
which its primary objective is limited to safeguarding an individual’s 
negative liberty67—freedom from interference with one’s life, liberty, 
or property.68 This form of liberalism denies that individuals have 
positive rights that the government must fulfill (for example, the right 
to adequate housing).69 
It is possible to take a broader view of the appropriate role of 
government, charging it with an affirmative obligation to further the 
 
 64. Bix, supra note 19, at 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 3 n.16; see also Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage—The Theoretical 
Perspective, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 107–08 (2003). 
 67. See, e.g., Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 
56–61 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 58. 
 69. It is not always possible to draw clear distinctions between negative and positive 
liberty. To the extent that negative liberty is a condition free from obstacles, then “positive 
liberty, in so far as it embodies a method of clearing obstacles, offers an account of how to 
obtain a condition of negative liberty.” Ian Harris, Isaiah Berlin: Two Concepts of Liberty, in 
THE POLITICAL CLASSICS 121, 129 (Murray Forsyth & Maurice Keens-Soper eds., 1996). 
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health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens. This has historically 
been the understanding of states’ proper role with respect to social 
and domestic relations regulation.70 This broader understanding of 
the state’s role finds support in the Constitution71 and is generally not 
the subject of controversy. 
Some commentators and state actors interpret broad state 
regulatory power as properly and “necessarily promot[ing] a shared 
moral vision of the good family life.”72 A counterargument is that the 
majority’s vision of the moral or good life ought not be the sole 
justification for public policy or state action. This view, articulated 
most strongly and famously by John Stuart Mill,73 was echoed in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas—“The issue is 
 
 70. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (the regulation of domestic relations is 
“an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”); Manigault 
v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (“[T]he state . . . exercis[es] such powers as are vested in 
it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public 
. . . . This power, which . . . is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right 
of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the 
people.”); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic 
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the 
laws of the United States.”); see also Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal 
Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994) (observing that family law has traditionally been an area 
of state regulation, and discussing various rationales for domestic relations exception to federal 
diversity jurisdiction); Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in 
American Family Law, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 278 (1995) (“The major legal debates about 
marriage took place in the states, which retained primary control over domestic relations.”). But 
see Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995) (arguing that 
“family law has emerged in recent years as an important arena of national interest, increasingly 
governed by national legislation”); Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, 
and a Quest for Policy, 33 FAM. L.Q. 843, 846–47 (1999) (noting that “[t]raditionally, states 
regulated family law under the Tenth Amendment because the federal government did not. . . . 
By the end of the century, however, Congress had enacted numerous federal statutes to address 
serious problems that states were either unwilling or unable to resolve.”). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 72. Dailey, supra note 70, at 1790; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“The State, representing the collective expression of moral aspirations, 
has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held 
values of its people.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse 
of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2526 (1994) (“[Family law serves] both as a 
mechanism for meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle for expressing our values 
and aspirations about family life to ourselves and to our children.”). 
 73.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80–81 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859). 
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whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [its] 
views . . . on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. 
‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code.’”74 At issue in Lawrence was a state’s use of criminal 
penalties to coerce behavior, but the view that bare morality is 
insufficient to justify state action can be logically extended to states’ 
use of civil liability (or benefits) to discourage or encourage 
behavior. 
In invalidating certain state regulations that enforce majoritarian 
moral values against unwilling individuals,75 the federal courts have 
set some limits on the extent to which majority moral values—the 
majority’s vision of the good or moral life—may ground state action. 
The precise boundaries of those limits, however, remain murky. The 
Supreme Court’s discomfort with imposing morality-based rules on 
individuals does suggest, however, that encouraging morality alone 
will not constitute a legitimate state interest in marriage nor alone 
justify continued marital privileging. 
What are the primary state interests, then, that justify state 
recognition and preferential treatment of marital families? A few 
themes recur,76 including: (1) encouraging stable relationships, which 
benefit both adults and the children in their care;77 (2) providing an 
 
 74. 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 850 (1992)). 
 75.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas statute 
imposing criminal penalty on homosexual sodomy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(invalidating Massachusetts statute that permitted married couples to obtain contraceptives, but 
prevented their distribution to unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (invalidating Connecticut statute prohibiting use or provision of contraceptives). 
 76. Others, of course, would characterize the state’s interests in marriage in slightly 
different ways. Professor Lynn Wardle, for example, suggests that the public interest in 
marriage includes the following: 
(1) [S]afe sexual relations; (2) responsible procreation; (3) optimal child-rearing; (4) 
healthy human development; (5) protecting those who undertake the most vulnerable 
family roles for the benefit of society, especially wives and mothers; (6) securing the 
stability and integrity of the basic unit of society; (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, 
and social order, and (8) facilitating interjurisdictional compatibility. 
Lynn Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State 
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 779–80 (2001). 
 77. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) 
(“Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient 
ones.”); see also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 283–88 (1991) (arguing that 
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optimal locus for procreation78 and ensuring the economic support 
and caretaking of both adult and child dependents from private rather 
than public sources;79 and (3) facilitating the efficient distribution of 
resources and serving as a proxy for deciding when an individual 
should receive certain benefits from or meet certain obligations 
toward another.80 
The next section briefly discusses those articulated interests. It 
evaluates each of the primary justifications for public or state-
supported marriage without limiting its analysis to those aspects of 
the justifications that are directly aimed at children. If a compelling 
non-child-related justification for marriage exists, it may be viewed 
as sufficient to justify state marriage (even if a child-related 
justification alone could not do so). 
B. Evaluating the State’s Interest in Marriage 
First, those who favor state involvement in marriage have argued 
that marriage best captures and expresses individuals’ commitment to 
each other.81 To the extent that norms of commitment and the 
 
marital families are best for children); Regan, Jr., supra note 61 (arguing that legal norms 
should be used to enforce marital commitment); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal 
Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1907–14 (2000) (discussing traditional norms of 
spousal and parental commitment). 
 78. See, e.g., Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What Are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage 
Laws? Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, 108th Cong. 
205 (2004) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“[A]s a matter of biology, only the union of a man 
and a woman can produce children. And as a matter of common sense, confirmed by social 
science, the union of man and woman is the optimal, most stable foundation for the family and 
for raising children.”); Wardle, supra note 76, at 780–81 (arguing that “society has a profound 
interest in responsible procreation”, and that [h]eterosexual marriage also appears to provide the 
best environment into which children can be born”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 386 (1978) (“[I]f appellee’s right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some 
right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations 
legally to take place.”). But see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (“[I]t is the exclusive and 
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, 
that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.”). 
 79. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 355–68 (discussing the traditional economic and 
caretaking functions of marriage); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (“[Marriage] ensures 
that children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from private rather than 
public funds.”). 
 80. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955–56; Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993). 
 81. See, e.g., Regan, Jr., supra note 61, at 123–24 (arguing that marital stability is a 
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stability that might come with them have been shown to benefit 
adults and the children in their care, it would appear logical to 
encourage those norms among all adults. However, to encourage and 
reward the norm of commitment when made by some adults (for 
instance, opposite-sex couples who marry) but not others (such as 
same-sex couples who generally may not marry, unmarried couples 
who are nonetheless in a committed relationship, or adults living in a 
committed but non-conjugal or non-sexual relationship) is anything 
but logical. The case is stronger, moreover, for encouraging and 
rewarding commitment to children rather than to other adults.82 
Second, many commentators have also argued that the marital 
family is the optimal context for procreation.83 But marital 
procreation does not stand as an end in itself; instead, it should 
further other legitimate state goals. To the extent that the state wishes 
to ensure that children are born into stable families where they will be 
well provided-for, the argument that marriage is the family form best 
suited for procreation bleeds into an argument that marriage is the 
optimal locus for child-rearing (which will be addressed next). 
Another possible justification for the state’s attempt to make 
marriage the exclusive locus for procreation is its desire to make 
marriage the exclusive locus for sexual activity itself. But sexual 
intimacy has been afforded constitutional privacy protections.84 
Commentators also argue that marriage is the best locus for child-
rearing.85 Part I examined the empirical research analyzing the 
superior outcomes enjoyed by children in marital versus non-marital 
families. Even if there is a “marriage effect” on children, it appears 
that other factors explain most of the differences in the well-being of 
children in married versus non-marital families.86 
 
substantive good, and that “the state may reasonably attempt to encourage intimate commitment 
as a valuable human good”). 
 82. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 13, at 335–45 (discussing the relatively weak interest 
of the state in the strictly companionate aspect of marriage). 
 83. See supra note 78. 
 84. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 85. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 77, at 283–88; Wardle, supra note 61, at 779. 
 86.  Among these other factors are the characteristics of the populations more or less likely 
to marry, and the many support received by marital families. See supra notes 51–52 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, the court in Goodridge acknowledged that significant benefits 
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If the state’s underlying goal is maximizing the well-being of 
children, then it is reasonable to assume that that means maximizing 
the well-being of all children. Thus, even assuming that marriage 
provides some benefit to the well-being of children, additional state 
support to and privileging of that family structure guarantees that 
other children will receive fewer benefits, at least in a relative sense. 
Privileging marriage might be justified if, as an empirical matter, the 
return on the state’s investment in that institution were sufficiently 
great to justify the actual cost, and the “cost” of the inherent 
unfairness. But, as discussed above, the state currently invests 
heavily—billions of dollars annually—in marriage,87 yet the research 
discussed in Part I suggests that the return on that investment—the 
increase in family and child well-being that may be attributed to 
marriage itself—is significantly smaller than is popularly believed. 
Finally states have an interest in using marriage as a proxy for the 
operation of default property, inheritance, and tax rules, and the 
distribution of other benefits. Doing so certainly eases administrative 
burdens and costs.88 But it can hardly be argued that administrative 
efficiency in administering these myriad benefits justifies their 
wholesale denial to other individuals. And it is certainly possible that 
other systems could be put into place to more equitably distribute 
benefits in a way that would not overly burden the public fisc. 
The state’s interests in marriage—or goals with respect to 
marriage—are thus deeply flawed. But for the sake of argument, let 
us assume some legitimate interest in marriage. The question that 
then remains is whether state regulation of marriage is sufficiently 
related to furthering its goals to be justifiable. This is the type of 
analysis performed by courts evaluating the constitutionality of 
certain regulations. But even outside the constitutional context, it is a 
useful analysis in determining the propriety or legitimacy of state 
action. A state may have a legitimate interest in the health, safety, or 
general welfare of its citizenry. But if it enacts rules or regulations 
that purport to further its interest in a manner that is inequitable or 
 
accrue to the children of marital families. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003). 
 87. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. 
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ineffective, then the resulting regulation is no more legitimate than if 
the state had not had a valid interest to begin with. Thus, both aspects 
of state action—the nature of the state’s interest or goals, as well as 
the means by which the state seeks to advance those interests—must 
be examined to determine the legitimacy of state action. 
It is reasonable to conclude that state privileging of marriage 
provides some net positive benefit to marital families’ and children’s 
well-being.89 In that sense, then, state support of marriage is 
effective, at least to some degree. But, does marital privileging 
encourage or increase the frequency of marriage? Researchers 
studying the influence of federal tax and transfer programs on 
individuals’ decisions to marry have found little or no effect, but in 
general, “findings are inconclusive.”90 If marital privileging is 
justified in part by arguments that such privileging encourages the 
formation of marital families, it seems relevant whether it actually 
has the intended effect. If individuals would marry even without the 
substantial supports currently provided by the state, then the state’s 
resources would appear to be currently misallocated. If state support 
of marriage does not encourage marriage, then the nexus between 
state regulation and state goals is weakened further. And, as I discuss 
elsewhere, empirical evidence suggests that new programs to 
promote marriage, particularly among economically disadvantaged 
 
 89. It is of course noteworthy that, despite the tremendous public investment in marriage, 
researchers have identified other factors as largely accounting for the difference between child 
well-being in marital versus non-marital families. See supra notes 33, 45–52 and accompanying 
text. 
 One notable exception to public support or subsidy of marriage may be tax and transfer 
penalties—recent research shows that many low- or moderate-income households (with annual 
incomes of less than $40,000) are penalized upon marriage. Adam Carasso & C. Eugene 
Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing Many Households with Children, 15 FUTURE 
CHILD. 157, 161 (2005). Transfer programs include means-tested programs for which citizens 
qualify only if their income and assets are below a certain level. The most significant include 
welfare (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), food stamps, housing assistance, child 
care, and Medicaid. Id. at 159. Lawmakers have begun trying to reduce marriage penalties, 
primarily by reducing taxes and reforming welfare. Notably, however, “in 2004, 81 percent of 
this marriage penalty relief was concentrated on couples earning above $75,000”). Id. at 162–
63. 
 90. Id. at 161 (“Some quantitative and ethnographic research suggests that people’s 
decisions to marry or divorce are governed much more by such considerations as a potential 
spouse’s suitability as a partner and as a parent, the desire for a fulfilling relationship, and the 
risk of infidelity, than by the tax and transfer program consequences.”). 
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individuals, can be expected to have little if any, effect on marriage 
rates.91 Moreover, many family groups who wish to (and do) raise 
children are prohibited from entering legal marriages, even if they 
desired to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
It stands to reason that if a public policy has a vastly different 
effect on two classes of child citizens (who are, in all relevant 
respects, similarly situated) it needs to meet a high standard of 
justification. Policies aimed at promoting the marriage effect fall 
short of such a standard. As discussed above, the magnitude of the 
marriage effect is notoriously difficult to get a handle on, but notably 
smaller than previously thought. 
Further, the beneficiaries of policies that seek to promote a 
“marriage effect” are a sub-group—children of marital families—of 
the larger group of intended beneficiaries—all children. As marital 
children are helped, the rest of the intended beneficiaries of these 
policies are neglected. This Essay finds this result insupportable. 
Family policy should benefit all families, and when the aim is to help 
children, policies should do so both directly and equitably. 
 
 91. See Vivian Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, 2007 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE 
& JUST. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author); see also supra notes 52–57 and 
accompanying text. Based on research of unmarried individuals’ attitudes toward and beliefs 
about marriage, and given the sorts of marriage promotion programs currently envisioned and 
implemented by states, the likelihood of success of such programs is doubtful. Importantly, 
unmarried poor individuals already aspire to marriage, and they expect that they will marry. See 
supra note 52. Public campaigns to convince them, then, that marriage is valuable are, 
according to some sociologists, “probably preaching to the choir.” Edin & Reed, supra note 52, 
at 128. 
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